-Este artículo se centra en el análisis de los estudios teóricos y empíricos sobre la sociología del cómic durante los siglos XX y XXI. Aunque en la actualidad el cómic está ampliamente aceptado en el ámbito académico, tanto en publicaciones periódicas como en monografías especializadas, esto no ha sido lo habitual en el pasado. Los primeros estudios fueron excepciones en el ámbito más amplio de la sociología de la comunicación, y no será hasta los años 50 cuando se popularicen en (...) la academia. Uno de los catalizadores de la sociología del cómic fue la obra de Umberto Eco (1968), a partir de la cual llegarían estudios más profundos como los de Dorfman y Mattelart (1971) o Luc Boltanski (1975). Finalmente, se analizan trabajos empíricos que toman como base el lenguaje del cómic. (shrink)

In Spain, the introduction of the new Diploma in Nursing in 1977 saw the role of nurses shifting from that of medical assistants with technical skills to being independent members of the healthcare team with specific responsibility for providing professional nursing care. Here, we analyse the evolution of the nursing profession in Spain following the transfer of nurse education to universities, doing so through interviews with the first generation of academic tutors. This was a qualitative study using the method of (...) analytic induction and based on the principles of grounded theory. Participants were selected by means of theoretical sampling and then underwent in‐depth interviews. Steps were taken to ensure the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of data. The main conclusion of the analysis is that there is a gap between a theoretical framework borrowed from the Anglo‐American context and a nursing practice that, in Spain, has traditionally prioritised the application of technical procedures, a role akin to that of a medical assistant. It is argued that a key factor underlying the way in which nursing in Spain has evolved in recent decades is the lack of conceptual clarity regarding what the role of the professional nurse might actually entail in practice. (shrink)

Psychological research shows that our emotions and feelings often guide the moral decisions we make about our own lives and the social groups to which we belong. But should we be concerned that out important moral judgments can be swayed by "hot" passions, such as anger, disgust, guilt, shame and sympathy? Aren't these feelings irrational and counterproductive? Using a functional conflict theory of emotions (FCT), Giner-Sorolla proposes that each emotion serves a number of different functions, sometimes inappropriately, and that (...) moral emotions in particular are intimately tied to problems faced by the individuals in a group, and by groups interacting with each other. Specifically, the author suggests that these emotions help us, as individuals and group members, to: Appraise developments in the environment Learn through association Regulate our own behavior Communicate convincingly with others. Drawing on extensive research, including many studies from the author's own lab, this book shows why emotions work to encourage reasonable moral behaviour, and why they sometimes fail. This is the first single-authored volume in the field of psychology dedicated to a separate examination of the major moral and positive emotions. As such, the book is ideal reading for researchers, postgraduates and undergraduates of social psychology, sociology, philosophy and politics. (shrink)

This paper examines a novel notion of causality, namely, fuzzy-set-theoretic causality. Over the last decade, a number of conceptual models of causality, in the language of fuzzy-set theory, have appeared in the scientific literature and have been applied to empirical research. They have circulated widely from one scientific discipline to another, weaving a unifying thread through them. However, they have received no philosophical attention. In this paper, I will discuss the value and limitations of this type of model and will (...) read into its application several dimensions of philosophical significance. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...) and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them. (shrink)

In jurisprudential literature, the adjective ‘defeasible’ appears as a predicate of many terms: concepts, laws, rules, reasoning, justification, proof, and so on. In this paper, we analyze the effects of some versions of the thesis of the defeasibility of legal norms on the reconstruction of the notion of legal validity. We analyze some possible justifications of this thesis considered as a claim concerning validity, and enquire into two possible sets of problems related to the defeasibility of the criteria of identification (...) of a legal system. We also provide a formalization of some options regarding defeasible criteria of identification, which can be used as a tool for meta-jurisprudential analysis. Finally, the thesis according to which defeasibility is better conceived of as a feature of legal application is examined and questioned. (shrink)

Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.

This article provides an analysis of the ethical behavior of managers making goodwill impairment decisions following the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standard 3 on Business Combinations. Replacing the systematic amortization of goodwill with the impairment-only approach has been a highly controversial step. Although the aim of IFRS 3 was to provide users with more value-relevant information regarding the underlying economics of the business, it has been criticized for the potential earnings management inherent in impairment testing. This study is (...) based on a sample of Spanish-listed companies between 2005 and 2011, a period that embraces the economic crisis. After controlling for the underlying economic factors of the firms, the results suggest that managers are exercising discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairment losses, and big bath and smoothing strategies are influencing the decisions, whether or not to impair goodwill and about the magnitude of the impairment. Firm size is an attribute that appears significant in the analysis, suggesting that the cost and complexity of running the impairment test affect managers’ decisions. Additional analyses suggest that the macroeconomic environment influences opportunistic and unethical behaviors. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

Although most consumers are positive about socially responsible companies, in order to benefit from CSR efforts, effective and clear CSR communication is important. However, due to the constantly rising profusion of eco-labels, based on either own claims from the organization or claims made by an external third party, consumers may encounter difficulties in identifying truly responsible firms, which could result in less effective CSR initiatives, even for those responsible firms. Therefore, building on attribution theory, this study seeks to identify how (...) uncertified internal CSR claims and external third-party CSR labels should be used in order to deter greenwashing and increase positive consumer evaluations. Within a 3 × 2 design, respondents are exposed to different coffee product packages measuring their attitude toward the brand, corporate credibility, purchase intention, and scent perception, as well as perceived attributional CSR motives. Overall, findings indicate that especially an external CSR label affects consumer responses toward the firm. Moreover, perceived CSR motives serve as a mediator between an external CSR label and corporate credibility and brand attitude, respectively. These findings warrant further consideration of introducing an external multilevel rating systems by governmental law. (shrink)

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

La intención principal del presente artículo se centra en tres puntos esenciales y correlacionados entre sí. Nuestra principal intención es presentar, argumentativamente, las razones por las que Juan David García Bacca habría cometido un error al traducir el término heideggeriano Sorge por preocupación y no por cuidado. Pretendemos sostener que el hecho de traducir Sorge por preocupación, distorsiona gravemente todo el andamiaje ontológico y existencial propuesto por Heidegger. Si esto es así, Juan David García Bacca habría elaborado un sistema crítico (...) contra Heidegger, sostenido sobre un error de fondo, de traducción y de nivel de discurso. Es decir, el filósofo español únicamente se habría quedado en un orden de discurso óntico y no ontológico tal y como exige el proyecto fenomenológico heideggeriano.The aim of this essay focuses on three main points which are essentials and related to each other. Our main aim is to present, in our argument, the reasons for which Juan David García Bacca would have erroneously translated Heidegger´s term “Sorge” for “concern” instead of “care”. We hope to maintain the argument that the fact of translating Sorge for concern seriously distorts the ontological and existential framework that Heidegger proposes. If this is a fact, Juan David García Bacca would have developed a critical system against Heidegger, held over a fundamental mistake, at both a discourse and a translation level. In this way, the Spanish philosopher would have only achieved an ontic discourse and not an ontologic one, which is what Heidegger´s phenomenological project requires. (shrink)

Nuestra intención en el presente trabajo es el siguiente: presentar del modo más sintético, concreto y preciso, las claves del “método dialéctico transfinitante” garcibacquiano. Analizaremos desde un punto de vista hermenéutico y crítico, el modo en el que el método dialéctico transfinitante es, en sí mismo, el sustento filosófico del humanismo positivo. Para ello, analizaremos los principales argumentos expuestos en Curso sistemático de filosofía actual que, a nuestro juicio, tal vez sea una de las obras más importantes de toda la (...) producción filosófica de García Bacca. Como trataremos de demostrar a lo largo del presente artículo, la viabilidad y puesta en marcha del humanismo positivo como posibilidad real depende, en gran medida, de la sostenibilidad argumentativa del método dialéctico transfinitante propuesto por García Bacca. (shrink)

En este artículo, la filosofía analítico-lingüística es identificada como la metodología predominante en la filosofía del deporte. Según esta propuesta metodológica, la búsqueda de la definición del deporte es la meta principal de la filosofía. La hermenéutica del deporte es opuesta a la de tipo analítico-lingüístico. Analizando el concepto de verdad de Heidegger, se comparan dos concepciones de la tarea de la filosofía: ontología y descrip-ción. La tarea de la hermenéutica del deporte tiene que ver con la descripción. Las expli-caciones (...) hermenéuticas del deporte son un intento de describir la facticidad del deporte, que está compuesta por tres momentos diferentes: corporalidad, capacidades, y tradici. (shrink)

En el presente artículo trataremos un tema inédito dentro de los estudios sobre la vida y obra de García Bacca. En especial, trataremos de ver en qué medida la obra de García Bacca puede ser interpretada como una expansión de los límites que, en opinión de Heidegger, la propuesta metafísica nietzscheana lleva asociado de modo intrínseco. En especial, trataremos de analizar comparativamente ambas propuestas metafísicas con el fin de demostrar que si bien parte de la génesis de la propuesta filosófica (...) garcibacquiana responde parcialmente ciertos elementos característicos de Nietzsche, el progresivo contacto de García Bacca con otras perspectivas políticas, filosóficas, económicas, etc., provocan una aproximación paralela a las obras de Machado y Marx. Dicha aproximación a estos y otros factores de influencia, provocan una transformación y ampliación en su propuesta filosófica. (shrink)

Partiendo de las categorías de ‘autoafirmación’ y ‘animal laborans’ propuestas por Blumenberg y Arendt, se dirime si el transhumanismo tiene alguna relación con el humanismo. Su contextualización permite encuadrar este movimiento dentro de la lógica del capitalismo de consumo, y definirlo como un paso más hacia la mercantilización de las distintas esferas de la vida. Se concluye que el transhumanismo es efectivamente un más allá del humanismo, si atendemos a las condiciones culturales y existenciales heredadas del proyecto emancipatorio moderno y (...) sus consecuencias en el desarrollo e innovación tecnológicos. (shrink)

In today's societies relationships between near relatives and friends appear to be somewhat paradoxical. Some accounts present them as the social ideal, exalting the solidarity and altruism represented by proximal relationships. By contrast, others point to the social dangers in such relationships when they are conducted in the public sphere. In order to grasp the coexistence of these opposite views, this article attempts to place proximal relationships in the explanatory context of a gift economy, a concept with a long history (...) in anthropology and which has lately been the focus of interest of a significant group of social thinkers. (shrink)

Libertad o utopía? -- Unamuno en el infierno -- El año de los poetas -- El hombre superior -- Concursos y premios literarios -- Por fortuna aún contamos con la poesía -- Desahogo lírico -- Xenofobia -- Variaciones sobre un tema de Omar Khayyam -- Simón Bolívar y la lectura -- El tierno encanto de las pequeñas ciudades.

In this paper I offer a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that ‘ethics is transcendental’. Initially, I set out to offer said interpretation by resorting to both Wittgenstein's understanding of ethics and his understanding of the transcendentality of logic—which entails taking Wittgenstein as endorsing a Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. This leads to the claim that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is the condition of a certain ethical experience. Nevertheless, this interpretation involves some inadequacies due to certain incompatibilities (...) between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the aforementioned Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. I identify the peculiarities of Wittgenstein's understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’, and on this basis, I set forth a novel interpretation of 6.421. Specifically, I argue that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is internal to or constitutive of a certain mystical view: viewing the world sub specie aeterni as something valuable. (shrink)

The conceptualization of the notion of subjectivity within the Anthropocene finds in Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanism one of its most explicit and profuse modulations. This essay argues that Braidotti’s model powerfully accounts for the Anthropocene’s subjectivity by conceiving the “self” as a transversal multiplicity and its relationality to the “others” and the “world” as non-hierarchized by nature–culture distinctions; however, by being ontologically grounded on a neo-Spinozistic monism, Braidotti’s model blurs the notions of finitude, agency, and change, obscuring the possibility of critical (...) dissent while decreasing the overall theory’s consistency. An alternative ontological model capitalizing on these elements can be found in Object-Oriented Ontology and its notion of withdrawal. By associating OOO’s non-onto-taxonomical pluralism with Braidotti’s posthuman subjectivity, this essay aims at ontologically discretizing the latter in order to overcome these limitations. Grounded on this association and invoking a narrative imaginary propelled by the Greek terms xenos and xenia, the article paves the way for a form of subjectivity deviating from Braidotti’s ecological model and defined as xenological, arguing that, within the context of the Anthropocene, it constitutes an adequate alternative to Braidotti’s subjectivity. (shrink)

Base-of-the-pyramid business models aim to achieve profitability and poverty reduction by including poor people into corporate value chains. This goal duality creates tensions. Actors’ responses to these tensions are influenced by their cognitive frames of the phenomena building the tension. Applying a cognitive perspective, I investigate how corporate actors with different frames of poverty respond proactively or defensively to the poverty–profitability tension by adapting business model elements. I find that proactive and defensive responses differ for actors holding different cognitive frames (...) of poverty. The responses have consequences for the poverty impact potential of BOP business models. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the similarities that stem from Wittgenstein’s (Philosophical Investigations (1953)) and Brandom’s (Making it Explicit (1994)) commitment to pragmatics in the philosophy of language to account for moral utterances. That is, the study of the meaning of moral utterances is carried out resorting to the study of the acts being performed in producing or exhibiting these utterances. Both authors offer, therefore, a pragmatic solution in order to account for the meaning of (...) our moral vocabulary and discursive practices. Secondly, it argues that both approaches lead to differing understandings of the role of “truth” and “falsity” in moral discourse. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics demonstrate a dismissive attitude towards the notions of truth and falsity in moral discourse. On the other hand, Brandom seems to be committed to a weak version of moral cognitivism: he takes assertions (which express beliefs, i.e. doxastic commitments) as the fundamental linguistic activity in the game of giving and asking for reasons and provides an anaphoric theory of truth to account for “truth” and “falsity” in our discourse. Additionally, it analyses how these differences bear on the Frege–Geach problem. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing system that performs (...) a cognitive task stands to the program that the system runs while performing that task. Next, I shall suggest that the kind of explanation that results from simulation is radically different in each case. In order to illustrate the difference, I will point out some prima facie methodological difficulties that need to be addressed in order to ensure that simulation plays a legitimate explanatory role in cognitive science, and I shall emphasize how those difficulties are very different depending on the notion of explanation involved. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...) are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose (...) a way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substituting the view that desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in Schopenhauer's arguments but, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is consistent with Schopenhauer's grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments. (shrink)

Algunas formulaciones de la filosofía política reciente han descuidado el carácter históricamente indexado de conceptos como libertad política, propiedad o soberanía, propiciando un uso anacrónico e impreciso de su significado. No obstante, su posición académica y social dominante informa el «sentido común» filosófico- político de nuestra época. Locke constituye un ejemplo de cómo la coyuntura interpretativa liberal, que se desplegó en el siglo XIX y se consolidó en el XX, ha oscurecido una parte de la complejidad y pluralidad de las (...) tradiciones intelectuales y normativas que heredó. La reconstrucción de la filosofía política lockeana a partir de su concepción fiduciaria de la libertad política contribuye a hacer de nuevo visible el significado de algunas concepciones fundamentales para la teorización normativa presente. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume gathers selected, refereed contributions on various aspects of public health from several disciplines and research fields, including the philosophy of science, epidemiology, statistics and ethics. The contributions were originally presented at the 1st Barcelona conference of “Philosophy of Public Health”. This book is intended for researchers interested in public health and the contemporary debates surrounding it.

To propose a clear psychological definition of morality is no easy task, and Dahl (2023) is to be commended here for not only doing so, but leaving an explicit paper trail of traits deemed desirable for any such proposal. However, while a rationale for calling phenomena “moral” would be useful, is it really as vital for the conduct of research as Dahl presumes? We instead argue that the definition of the term “morality” is not always a task of scientific definition (...) similar to defining “cell” or “attitude”, but rather can be seen as a meta-scientific task for organising research. When morality itself is a construct that figures in theories and hypotheses, this construct usually depends on lay views of whether the moral realm is involved. This insight, in our view, argues for a broader rather than narrower approach to defining morality, which we explain in the final section. (shrink)

RESUMENEl presente artículo pretende dar cuenta del origen y cambio radical de paradigma filosófico sufrido por el filósofo de origen Navarro Juan David García Bacca. En especial, trataremos de analizar cómo y por qué razón, el filósofo español pasa de desestimar la posibilidad de una forma propia del filosofar español desde una perspectiva ontológica, hasta tratar la poesía y la literatura como las formas idiosincráticas del hacer filosofía en español. Esta forma característicamente española de hacer filosofía en español será, pues, (...) determinante para la comprensión del abandono de la etapa existencialista garcibaccquiana, y su renovado interés por la obra del poeta Antonio Machado, y su filosofar por y para el pueblo.PALABRAS CLAVEONTOLOGÍA, GARCÍA BACCA, FILOSOFÍA, ESPAÑOLABSTRACTThis paper pursues to explain the origin and radical philosophical paradigm shift undergone by the philosopher from Navarre Juan David Garcia Bacca. Specifically, we will try to analyze how and why the Spanish philosopher moves from dismissing the possibility of a particular form of Spanish philosophizing from an ontological perspective, to treating poetry and literature as idiosyncratic ways of doing philosophy in Spanish. This typically Spanish way of doing philosophy in Spanish will be, therefore, crucial to understand the abandonment of the Garcibaccquian existentialist stage, and his renewed interest in the work of the poet Antonio Machado and his philosophizing by and for the peopleKEYWORDSONTOLOGY, GARCÍA BACCA, PHILOSOPHY, SPANISH. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el concepto de imperativo metanoético que Peter Sloterdijk presenta en ¡Has de cambiar tu vida! Nuestro objetivo es iluminar la naturaleza de lo que, en trabajos anteriores, hemos denominado -a raíz de la obra de Bernard Suits-: razón lúdica. Para ello, primero, expondremos y analizaremos el sentido del imperativo metanoético en Sloterdijk, así como los elementos principales de su razón ascética. Segundo, mostraremos cómo ambos son consecuencia del análisis ontológico de corte heideggeriano en la que (...) Sloterdijk basa su propuesta de filosofía moral. Tercero, presentaremos en términos sloterdijkianos tanto el análisis ontológico de Suits, como el posible imperativo metanoético que se desprendería de su razón lúdica. Por último, centrándonos en el papel que Sloterdijk otorga a la figura del «ocioso», mostraremos las posibles conexiones entre Suits y Sloterdijk. Mostraremos la relación que existe entre los imperativos lúdicos y ascéticos donde, además, el acto «jugar» recibe un papel central en la «respuesta a la pregunta por el ser». In this article, we analyze Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of “metanoethical imperative” in You Must Change Your Life. Our goal is to shed light on what, by drawing on Bernard Suits, we call “ludic reason.” To do so, we will present and examine in depth the meaning of Sloterdijk’s metanoethical imperative, as well as the main features of his concept of “askesis.” Second, we will argue that both concepts are the result of the Heideggerian ontological principles underlying Sloterdijk’s moral philosophy. Third, we will provide a “Sloterdijkean” interpretation of Suits’ account of games by focusing on the metanoethical imperative that could be derived from the notion of the ludic reason. To conclude, we will focus on the role that the figure of the “Good-for-Nothing” plays in Sloterdijk’s account, showing connections between Suits’ and Sloterdijk’s approaches. We will argue that, in the philosophical approaches of both philosophers, the idea of game playing is closely tied to the “question on Being.”. (shrink)